[usually I post about something venture capital on Tuesdays. Today’s article by Atlantic Council’s Fred Kempe made me switch up a few things — stay with me, it’ll be about venture capital…]

This is Part I. Part II tomorrow, Part III Thursday.

In his Atlantic Council article, “Europe is ‘not ready’ for the Russian threat. At least it now has a plan,” Frederick Kempe highlights significant concerns about Europe’s preparedness in the face of an evolving Russian military threat. Despite substantial defense spending commitments, including plans to allocate up to 5% of GDP by 2035, these measures may not be timely enough to counter immediate challenges. Kempe emphasizes that Russia’s military capabilities have grown more formidable, with advancements in drone technology and battlefield experience. European intelligence assessments suggest that Russia could test NATO’s Article 5 commitments within the next three to five years, or potentially sooner.

“We are not ready,” Kubilius tells me. “Day X is coming, and we need to see the picture clearly, the very real threat from [Russian President Vladimir] Putin” and his battle-hardened Russian army, now equipped with millions of drones.”

Frederick comes to the conclusion that Europe is not ready.

A. Wess Mitchell has advocated a sequential approach to dealing with the threat of simultaneous conflicts with Russia, China and Iran. In a recent debate on War On The Rocks he argues:

And so my argument is, the optimal strategy would be a sequencing strategy or sequential strategy where we try with the resources we have now, you know, military as well as diplomacy allies to tourniquet the secondary and tertiary theaters, the situation in Ukraine, the situation in Middle East, with a view to concentrating our military resources in the near future against the main rival, which is China. So that’s the basic argument. The reason I think this is the right strategy: It plays to our enemy’s disadvantages. Putin moved on a quicker timetable in Ukraine than Xi was prepared to move against Taiwan.

But what if Europe is not “unready” [is that a word?] — but misaligned? The issue is not just quantity of ships or shells, but the architecture of intent, production capacity, and force structure that defines a resilient and asymmetric response.

I don’t just ask “do we have enough?”, I am asking:

• Are we building what the future fight demands, or reinforcing Cold War lagging indicators?
• Are we scaling systems that are ethically and tactically stable?
• Do our investments create optionality, or just larger sunk costs?

Kempe’s Key Arguments

Fred Kempe argues:

• Russia is outproducing NATO in 155mm shells 4:1.
• China has the largest navy by hull count.
• European countries remain fragmented and under-spent.
• U.S. industrial base remains brittle, slow, and peacetime-optimized.

Valid concerns — but Kempe’s framing assumes parity warfare, slow coalition alignment, and linear escalation. These are not laws of war — they are artifacts of legacy institutions.

1. Shell Superiority ≠ Kill Chain Superiority

What if NATO produces 1/4 the artillery shells, but 10x more loitering and smart munitions?

• Alternate Fact: NATO doctrinally shifts toward precision-first, sensor-fused artillery (guided 155mm, AI fire control).
• Plausibility Source: Rheinmetall, BAE, and Nammo are scaling smart ammo lines; Estonia and Poland already prototyping adaptive munitions.
• Implication: Russia’s shell advantage becomes a logistical liability — more rounds, more trucks, more exposure.

2. China’s Navy Is a Target-Rich Environment

What if the PLA Navy’s numerical advantage becomes a vulnerability in a swarming doctrine environment?

• Alternate Fact: NATO deploys thousands of unmanned surface/underwater vehicles (USVs/UUVs) with modular kill payloads (loitering, ESM, EMP, anti-ship).
• Precedent: DARPA NOMARS, Anduril Ghost Fleet, French Navy’s SYRACUSE integration plans.
• Implication: Each Chinese destroyer faces exponential kill chains — quantity meets distributed attrition.

3. Industrial Mobilization Is the New Deterrent

What if NATO’s real deterrent is latent capacity + production agility?

• Alternate Fact: NATO uses peacetime capital to harden energy infrastructure and automate military production (e.g., agile CNC-based shell lines, verticalized missile fab).
• Source: Modigliani & MacGregor highlight DoD shifts to dynamic acquisition and AI-managed logistics.
• Implication: Readiness ≠ stockpiles. It means how fast you can switch from “idea” to “inventory.”

4. AI + ISR Integration as a Force Multiplier

What if battlefield dominance isn’t about volume but closure of the sensor-shooter loop?

• Alternate Fact: NATO’s real advantage is sovereign software (AI C2, automated mission planning, cognitive electronic warfare).
• Supporting Argument: Ram Charan notes modern armed conflict is “run by data” — victory lies in asymmetric cognition, not symmetric metal.
• Implication: NATO can fight with smaller forces, faster kill webs, and AI-enabled improvisation.

Indo-Pacific Conflict: Unequal Strategies

I likewise argue — like above in the European case — that the US and China are misaligned. The U.S. is structurally inertial at scale. Its DOD acquisitions cycle averages 7–12 years. Both H.R.1 and the draft version of H.R. 3838 (IH) are trying to address that. NATO lacks a unified Indo-Pacific posture — it is geographically diluted and politically slow. China’s innovation in hypersonics, naval ISR, swarm systems, and AI-enabled kill chains is state-coordinated, not just state-funded.

U.S. and NATO remain platform-centric: aircraft carriers, fifth-gen fighters, large submarines. China’s military R&D is swarm-centric, logistics-saturated, and designed to win short wars. PLA naval units drill for kill-chain disruption and domain saturation, not classic blue-water warfare.

Deterrence now requires not just weapons but perceived will, unpredictability, and survivability. China’s calculus favors limited engagements and rapid faits accomplis — not extended wars. Western escalation signals are often ambiguous or delayed, weakening deterrent value.

1. Strategic Culture: “Win without fighting” + Decisive early advantage

• The PLA draws heavily from Active Defense doctrine, which blends preemption, denial, and political control — not sustained attrition.
• Their approach mirrors Soviet Operational Art: wars are not total, but won through system destruction in the early phase — what PLA calls “System Destruction Warfare”
• Emphasis is on strategic paralysis, not prolonged exchange.

[Source: Science of Military Strategy (AMS, 2013); Elsa Kania, CNA reports]

2. Force Structure and Procurement Patterns

• PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) prioritizes precision strike systems designed to disable infrastructure and command nodes, not hold territory long-term.
• China’s naval procurement focuses on short-range saturation (Type 056 corvettes, Type 022 missile boats, YJ-series ASCMs), optimized for regional littoral dominance, not expeditionary warfare.

Source: RAND (2022), China’s Evolving Missile Forces; IISS Military Balance.

3. Exercises and Wargames

• Major PLA exercises (e.g. Eastern Theater Command drills after Pelosi’s Taiwan visit) simulate:
  • Encirclement and blockade
  • First-strike missile raids
  • Jamming and cyber attacks to paralyze early response

These reflect intent to impose a rapid fait accompli (e.g., seizing ports, isolating islands) before the U.S. or allies can effectively mobilize.

Source: CSIS AMTI analysis (2022), ONI briefings on PLAN operational patterns.

4. Political Warfare and Psychological Signaling

• China’s use of salami slicing tactics in the South China Sea, Ladakh, and East China Sea reflects a consistent strategy: Incremental coercion backed by rapid militarized reinforcement, followed by diplomatic normalization.

The same logic applies in Taiwan or first-island-chain contingencies: rapid, limited force to present the world with a new status quo.

Source: Oriana Skylar Mastro (Brookings, 2021); Toshi Yoshihara, Red Star Over the Pacific.

5. Taiwan-Specific Writings

• Internal PLA planning documents describe “Three-Day War” scenarios, seizing control before U.S. carrier groups arrive. Even if unrealistic, this reveals intent to exploit delay gaps.

Source: Michael Hunzeker (Foreign Affairs, 2023); Ian Easton, The Chinese Invasion Threat.

SO WHAT?!

The phrase “limited engagements and rapid faits accomplis” isn’t a projection — it’s a central feature of China’s military, political, and cognitive warfare strategy. They assume deterrence fails. So their goal is speed and confusion, not conquest or long war.

How do we innovate? What are key components or lethal warfare and lethal response? What are venture-backable responses, and what requires traditional prime and DoD innovation pathways? In tomorrow’s post, I’ll go through a hypotherical FRAGPLAN “Typhon Blade”. And what it means for innovative companies in the US and Europe.